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Abstract 
 The purpose of this study was to examine cognitive biases in clinically anxious children 
compared to normal children and to determine if cognitive biases could discriminate anxious 
youth from non-anxious youth.  Two specific cognitive biases were the focus of the present 
study—interpretive biases (i.e., the tendency to interpret neutral stimuli in a negative way) and 
judgment biases (i.e., a lowered estimate of one’s ability to cope with a threatening situation).  
Twenty-four youth comprised the anxiety disordered sample and were each matched to two 
normal youth on four demographic variables (gender, age, ethnicity, and family income level), 
thus the matched comparison sample consisted of 48 youth (ages 7 to 17).  Interpretive biases 
were assessed with the Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CNCEQ) and 
judgment biases were assessed with the Anxiety Control Questionnaire—child form (ACQ-C).  
In addition, self-reported symptoms of anxiety and depression and parent-reported internalizing 
and externalizing symptoms were measured.  Results indicated that (1) children in the clinic 
sample exhibited significantly more interpretive biases and judgment biases relative to the 
control sample, and scored significantly higher on measures of anxiety, depression, and parent-
reported internalizing and externalizing symptoms relative to the control sample, (2) the ACQ-C 
demonstrated incremental validity over the CNCEQ in predicting diagnostic status, (3) the ACQ-
C predicted diagnostic status while controlling for Generalized Anxiety Disorder symptoms and 
parent-reported internalizing and externalizing symptoms, but not while controlling for RCMAS 
(anxiety) and CDI (depression) scores, and (4) the relationship between the CNCEQ and 
diagnostic status was moderated by age and gender.  This study adds to the research literature by 
demonstrating elevated CNCEQ scores among youth with anxiety disorders compared to non-
anxious youth and extends findings with the ACQ-C by showing its incremental validity beyond 
the CNCEQ.  The results also add to the understanding of the assessment of negative cognitive 
vi 
errors by highlighting developmental and sex differences in their association with anxiety 
disorder status in youth.  Implications of the positive findings for theory and practice are noted 
and theoretical and methodological reasons for the negative results are discussed to highlight 
suggestions for future work in this area.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: anxiety, children, cognitive biases, interpretive biases, judgment biases, negative 
cognitive errors, anxiety control beliefs 
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Introduction 
The alarming prevalence of anxiety disorders in children and adolescents and the 
functional impairment and distress that they cause highlights the need to understand the origins 
and maintenance of this phenomenon.  Anxiety disorders are among the most common forms of 
emotional problems in youth, with estimates as high as 20% (Albano, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1996; 
Costello, Egger, & Angold, 2004).  In recent years, theoretical models of the development and 
maintenance of anxiety problems in childhood have suggested a need to address the cognitive 
dimension of anxiety (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Vasey & Dadds, 2001; Weems & Stickle, 2005; 
Weems & Silverman, 2006).  Cognitive and information processing models propose that anxious 
youth exhibit biased ways of thinking.  These models focus on the way that youth process 
information including attention toward threatening stimuli, the recall of past experiences, the 
interpretation of stimuli and situations, and the judgment of coping ability (Chorpita & Barlow, 
1998; Vasey & Dadds, 2001; Weems & Stickle, 2005; Weems & Silverman, 2006).  That is, 
anxious children presumably over-attend to threatening stimuli, recall disproportionately 
negative information about past experiences, interpret ambiguous stimuli in a negative way, etc.  
The manner in which anxious individuals process and interpret their life experiences may reveal 
possible etiological mechanisms in anxiety disorders.  The cognitive view of childhood anxiety, 
though, is best understood within the broader framework of a developmental psychopathology 
model of anxiety, which suggests that there are biological, behavioral, social, and cognitive 
processes potentially interacting over the lifespan that lead to and maintain anxiety problems 
(Vasey & Dadds, 2001; Weems, 2008; Weems & Stickle, 2005).  Anxiety problems are not the 
result of one cause but, rather, the outcome of a complex interaction of many factors.     
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This document is divided into four sections.  The first section provides an overview of the 
concept of anxiety and its disorders (e.g., anxiety is defined; the anxiety disorders listed in the 
DSM-IV are delineated).  In addition, the current treatment methods of anxiety disorders in 
children are briefly noted.  In the next section, the etiology of anxiety disorders is reviewed in 
terms of the biological, behavioral, social, and cognitive processes that may have an effect on the 
development of anxiety.  The third section focuses on the cognitive processes involved in 
pathological anxiety and these processes are examined in order to develop the rational for the 
current study.  In the final section, the current study is delineated in terms of specific study 
hypotheses and goals.    
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I. Anxiety, Its Disorders, and their Treatment 
Defining Anxiety  
 Biologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists have long acknowledged the functional 
purpose of anxiety (Beck, 1976).  Anxiety is an emotional state produced by the brain systems 
involved in sympathetic arousal and fear responses.  It also entails the negative affect and 
behavioral avoidance that may result from the activation of the anxiety response system (Baving, 
Laucht, & Schmidt, 2002; Davidson & Fox, 1989; Davidson, Marshall, Tomarken, & Henriques, 
2000; LeDoux, 2000).  It is a basic and essential biological mechanism used for motivation to act 
in response to threat or danger.  Worry, a component of the anxiety response system, can be 
useful in that it prepares the individual to anticipate future danger (Weems & Silverman, 2008).  
The purpose of activating the anxiety response system is to effectively cope with the threat and 
increase one’s chances of survival, and is therefore a necessary mechanism (Craske, 2003).   
A defining feature of pathological anxiety is dysregulation of the normal response system 
(Barlow, 2002; Weems & Silverman, 2008).  A reaction may be considered abnormal if no 
objective danger is present or the intensity of the anxiety is significantly disproportionate to the 
danger (Beck, 1976).  If the anxiety response system is continually activated when the problem is 
not an actual danger but, rather, a misperception or exaggeration of the danger, this biological 
mechanism is inappropriate and ineffective (Beck, Emery, and Greenberg, 1985).  Worry, for 
example, can be maladaptive if it is so intense that it actually interferes with a person’s ability to 
deal with a dangerous situation.  Beck (1976) described the problem of anxiety as an “overactive 
alarm system” (p. 155).  An additional feature of pathological anxiety is the emotional distress 
and functional impairment caused by dysregulation of the anxiety response system.  These 
features can emerge as physiological symptoms (e.g., racing heart), behavioral symptoms (e.g., 
4 
avoidance), social symptoms (e.g., interpersonal difficulties), or cognitive symptoms (e.g., 
cognitive biases; Weems & Silverman, 2008).       
DSM Anxiety Disorders 
 Anxiety disorders are some of the most common psychiatric disorders in childhood and 
adolescence.  Current or short-term prevalence rates for anxiety are approximately 2% to 4%, 
while prevalence rates over 6 months, 12 months, or lifetime are approximately 10% to 20% 
(Costello et al., 2004).  Anxiety disorders in youth can cause significant impairment in many 
areas of a child’s life (e.g., school, peer relationships, family) and can lead to psychological 
problems later in life (Kendall, Safford, Flannery-Schroeder, & Webb, 2004; Pine, Cohen, 
Gurley, Brook, & Ma, 1998; Silverman & Berman, 2001; Silverman & Treffers, 2001).   
 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) lists seven anxiety disorders and describes specific features of 
each disorder for diagnostic purposes.  The main clinical traits of each disorder are as follows: 
(1) Separation Anxiety Disorder is characterized by developmentally inappropriate and excessive 
anxiety concerning separation from the home or from those to whom the individual is attached; 
(2) Social Phobia is characterized by an excessive, unwarranted fear of social or performance 
situations in which embarrassment may occur; (3) Specific phobias are characterized by extreme, 
unwarranted fears of a specific object or situation, such as storms, elevators, choking, certain 
animals, etc.; (4) Generalized Anxiety Disorder is characterized by unreasonable and persistent 
worry about a number of events or situations; (5) Obsessive Compulsive Disorder is 
characterized by recurrent thoughts or compulsions that are distressful, time consuming, and 
functionally impairing; (6) Panic Disorder is characterized by recurrent, unexpected panic attacks 
(i.e., pounding heart, sweating, shortness of breath, chest pain, fear of dying, etc.).  A child with 
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Panic Disorder may show agoraphobia in which he or she avoids places or situations from which 
escape might be difficult in the event of an unexpected panic attack; (7) Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder may develop in an individual who was exposed to an extreme traumatic stressor.  
Symptoms can include intense psychological distress, helplessness, recurrent and intrusive 
recollections of the event, efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, places, or people that remind the 
child of the trauma, a restricted range of affect, and symptoms of increased arousal.  With the 
exception of Separation Anxiety Disorder, the same diagnostic criteria apply to both children and 
adults for the anxiety disorders.  This dissertation study will be comprised of youth who meet the 
criteria for any of the above anxiety disorders (including those with more than one anxiety 
disorder diagnosis).   
Although the anxiety disorders can be distinguished by unique features, they all share 
what is common to pathological anxiety—emotional distress and functional impairment caused 
by dysregulation of the normal anxiety response.  While specific anxiety disorder diagnoses may 
be unstable over time throughout childhood and adolescence, the presence of any anxiety 
disorder or another psychological disorder is a more stable occurrence (e.g., Last, Perrin, Hersen, 
& Kazdin, 1996).  That is, the central pathological traits seem to be relatively stable.  As 
recommended by Weems (2008), it may be beneficial to view the symptoms of anxiety disorders 
as core features (e.g., intense worry) and secondary features (i.e., those specific symptoms that 
differentiate the DSM anxiety disorders).  Faulty cognitive processes, for example, such as 
viewing a neutral situation as dangerous or misjudging one’s ability to cope, can be considered a 
core feature and can be characteristic of any anxiety disorder.  A child’s tendency toward 
cognitive distortions, for instance, may persist while he or she is diagnosed with Social Anxiety 
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Disorder at age 11 and Generalized Anxiety Disorder at age 16.  This dissertation study will 
asses cognitive processes in youth diagnosed with any DSM anxiety disorder.              
Treatment  
 Anxiety disorders are, unfortunately, very common in children and adolescents and can 
interfere with normal functioning in various areas (e.g., family, school, peer relations; McClure 
& Pine, 2006; Silverman & Berman, 2001).  In addition, childhood anxiety disorders are often 
chronic and persist into adulthood (Keller et al., 1992; Ollendick & King, 1994).  Anxiety 
disorders in childhood are associated with adult anxiety and depressive disorders, as well as 
substance abuse problems later in life (Kendall et al., 2004; Pine et al., 1998).   
Fortunately, the past decade has shown substantial progress in the area of psychosocial 
treatments for anxiety disorders in children and adolescents.  Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT) 
is becoming a commonly used treatment for anxiety disorders in youth.  A main goal in CBT is 
to identify and change anxiety producing cognitions (Kendall, 1994).  Individual CBT and Group 
CBT have met criteria for “probably efficacious treatments” (i.e., at least two good experiments 
have shown that the treatment is superior [statistically significantly so] to a wait-list control 
group; Chambless et al., 1998; Chambless et al., 1996).  These interventions mainly involve: 
gradual exposures, relaxation, developing coping plans, the use of cognitive self-control, and the 
use of self-evaluation and self-reward (e.g., Barrett, 1998; Barrett, Dadds, & Rapee, 1996; 
Flannery-Schroeder & Kendall, 2000; Kendall, 1994; Kendall et al., 1997; Mendlowitz et al., 
1999; Rapee, Abbott, & Lyneham, 2006; Silverman et al., 1999; Spence, Holmes, March, & 
Lipp, 2006; see Silverman, Pina, & Viswesvaran, 2008 for a review).  These treatments have 
been used to target a variety of primary anxiety disorder diagnoses.  Individual CBT and Group 
CBT have been shown to be similar in terms of relative efficacy (Flannery-Schroeder & Kendall, 
7 
2000; Manassis et al., 2002).  In addition, treatment outcomes seem to be similar with and 
without parent involvement.  While there is support for the use of cognitive intervention 
strategies in improving the symptoms of anxiety, it is not always clear whether there has been 
actual change in cognitive processes (Alfano, Beidel, & Turner, 2002).  A better understanding 
of anxiety-related cognitions may help explain if changes in specific cognitive processes can 
account for reductions in anxiety (Weems & Watts, 2005).     
Although several psychosocial treatments for anxiety disorders in children and 
adolescents have been shown to be efficacious, the rates of recovery are not perfect.  Silverman 
and colleagues (Silverman et al., 2008) reviewed 32 group design treatment studies for childhood 
anxiety disorders, most of which evaluated a combination of therapeutic strategies and most 
considered methodologically rigorous, and found that diagnostic recovery rates ranged from 25% 
to 92%.  While this is very promising research and has already benefited many children, it brings 
up some unexplained issues regarding exactly why and how the treatments worked and why 
some individuals did not improve.     
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II. Etiology of Anxiety Disorders 
A comprehensive theory of anxiety etiology may help in developing explanations of the 
developmental pathways to pathological anxiety and, in turn, in improving treatment methods 
targeted at anxious youth.  Furthermore, it would be more beneficial to prevent a problem before 
it develops.  That is, a clear understanding of etiology may aid in not only creating more 
efficacious treatments, but also in developing preventive interventions.    
According to the developmental psychopathology model, etiology can be viewed as an 
interrelated system of constructs and processes, rather than a single disease process (Weems & 
Stickle, 2005).  In keeping with this view, anxiety disorders are hypothesized to result from a 
complex interplay of biological (temperament, genetics, psychophysiology), behavioral (learning 
processes), social (attachment, interpersonal relationships), and cognitive (information 
processing/interpretation) factors (Askew & Field, 2007; Field & Lawson, 2003; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006; Puliafico & Kendall, 2006; Vasey & Dadds, 2001; Weems & Silverman, 2008; 
Weems & Stickle, 2005).  These causal mechanisms can potentially interact with each other over 
time to put an individual at risk for an anxiety disorder.  They may create this risk, in theory, by 
causing deviations in normal levels of constructs such as intense worry, intense fear, negative 
affectivity, hyperarousal, avoidance/withdrawal, and cognitive biases.  That is, the abnormal 
experience of these constructs may become maladaptive and functionally impairing, and lead to 
anxiety disorder diagnosis (Weems & Stickle, 2005).   
On the other hand, the biological, behavioral, social, and cognitive processes can exist in 
any individual and will not necessarily lead to a disorder.  There are biological, behavioral, 
social, and cognitive protective factors as well (Vasey & Dadds, 2001).  Anxiety disorders 
(viewed as a product of the causal mechanisms), like any outcome of development, can be 
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reached from various risk factors and through various processes (i.e., “equifinality”; Cicchetti & 
Rogosch, 1996).  Furthermore, particular risk factors and/or detrimental processes may not 
inevitably lead to the same outcome (e.g., anxiety disorder) in every individual (i.e., 
“multifinality”; Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996).  This situation emphasizes the need to appreciate 
the very complex manner in which an individual may come to experience pathological anxiety.  
In trying to understand the etiology of anxiety disorders in childhood more clearly, it seems 
useful to study diagnostic symptoms (such as those listed in the DSM) together with the 
underlying causal mechanisms of the disorder (Weems & Stickle, 2005).    
Biological Basis 
 As mentioned, the cognitive view of childhood anxiety is best understood within the 
broader framework of biological, behavioral, social, and cognitive processes potentially 
interacting over the lifespan and leading to anxiety problems.  Genetic theories hypothesize that 
risk for symptoms of anxiety is transmitted genetically and twin studies suggest that there is a 
moderate genetic risk for anxious symptoms (e.g, Distel et al., 2008; Eley, Gregory, Clark & 
Ehlers, 2007; Hettema, Neale, & Kendler, 2001; Kendler, Myers, Prescott, & Neale, 2001; 
Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1992; Sundet, Skre, Okkenhaug, & Tambs, 2003).  
Biological theories are based on the biology of normal stress and anxiety and research has found 
abnormal sympathetic nervous system responding in anxious individuals (i.e., the sympathetic 
nervous system is activated too frequently and/or to a greater magnitude than is necessary based 
on the stressor; Beidel, 1991; Carrion et al., 2002; Weems, Zakem, Costa, Cannon, & Watts, 
2005).  
Other biologically based theories focus on genetically inherited temperamental 
characteristics such as behavioral inhibition, which has been proposed as a risk factor for 
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anxiety.  Behavioral inhibition is defined as the consistent tendency to show marked fearfulness 
or behavioral restraint when encountering unfamiliar people, situations, or events; and, it has 
been shown to be largely genetically based (Kagan, Reznick, & Snidman, 1988; Robinson, 
Kagan, Reznick, & Corley, 1992).  Behavioral inhibition is thought to represent a lower 
threshold to sympathetic nervous system arousal (Kagan et al., 1988) and research in this area 
has found associations between behavioral inhibition and risk for anxiety disorders, particularly 
social phobia (Biederman et al., 2001; Biederman et al., 1993; Biederman et al., 1990; Hayward, 
Killen, Kraemer, & Taylor, 1998; Hirshfeld-Becker et al., 2007; Hirshfeld et al., 1992; Schwartz, 
Snidman, & Kagan, 1999). 
In regards to the origins of cognitive biases, it has been suggested that some individuals 
may have a genetically-based vulnerability (Muris & Field, 2008).  Pine (2007) proposed a 
model in which brain circuitry involved in the shaping of threat responses is dysregulated, and is 
manifested in distorted information processing and, thus, pathological anxiety.  In addition, there 
may be biological factors that serve to protect an individual from cognitive biases.  There is 
some support for the idea that effortful control—a partly innate self-regulative process that 
concerns the ability to control one’s cognitive processes (e.g., attention) and behavior when 
needed—can be a protective factor for cognitive biases (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Lonigan, 
Vasey, Phillips, & Hazen, 2004; Muris, Meesters, & Rompelberg, 2007).  While biological 
factors are important to consider in explaining the origins of anxiety, they likely interact with 
other complex processes (i.e., behavioral, social, cognitive) to produce pathological anxiety.   
Behavioral Learning Basis 
Most researchers today propose that there are several learning pathways to anxiety.  
Rachman (1977) suggested that fears can be acquired by three pathways: classical conditioning, 
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vicarious exposures, and the verbal transmission of information.  Fears that can be traced to 
specific instances are more easily explained by the classical conditioning theory (e.g., exposure 
to traumatic events).  Secondly, an individual may develop a fear by observing the actions of 
others (i.e., vicarious acquisition).  Thirdly, an individual may acquire a fear by discussing 
fearful things with others.   
Ollendick, Vasey, and King (2001) have added that operant conditioning mechanisms can 
be an additional pathway to anxiety.  The authors have proposed that avoidance of feared stimuli 
can serve to exacerbate normal anxiety responses into problematic anxiety.  That is, when a child 
avoids a fear-provoking stimulus, he or she may be negatively reinforced by the removal of 
anxiety.  It is also possible that caregivers reinforce the child through approval of avoidance 
behaviors (Ollendick et al., 2001).  Furthermore, researchers have suggested that it is unlikely 
that fear pathways work in isolation (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006) and that the interaction of 
multiple pathways is the most common cause of fear (Merckelbach, de Ruiter, van den Hout, & 
Hoekstra, 1989; Muris, 2007; Ollendick & King, 1991).   
There have been research experiments with adults that have shown that cognitive biases 
can be learned by non-anxious individuals.  Mathews and colleagues (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) created an experimental paradigm in which they induced 
interpretation bias in participants that lasted beyond training trials and, more importantly, 
demonstrated that state anxiety increased as a direct result of acquiring the interpretation bias.  In 
addition, MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, and Holker (2002) trained participants to 
acquire an attention bias to threat by using a modified dot-probe task.  The researchers also 
found that this bias led to increased negative mood during a later stress task.  Although no 
studies have been conducted with children or adolescents, it seems possible that normal youth 
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can also acquire cognitive biases through learning processes.  Research has suggested that 
behavioral factors are relevant when trying to understand the origins of childhood anxiety 
disorders; but, they do not give a complete picture and should be considered along with anxiety-
related biological, social, and cognitive factors.          
Social Basis 
Social models used to explain the etiology of anxiety highlight the importance of a 
child’s relationships with others.  Research has shown that a child’s social relationships may 
influence the development of anxiety disorders.  The development of social relationships begins 
in infancy when the child must attach to the primary caregiver, and this is the foundation upon 
which other relationships are established.  Insecure attachment is related to and predictive of 
maladaptive social behaviors (see Rubin & Parker, 2006) as well as a risk factor for 
psychological problems, including anxiety (Bowlby, 1973, 1980).   
Parental psychological control, which is defined as a harmful way of controlling children 
that inhibits psychological development through the manipulation of the parent-child 
relationship, expressions of disappointment and shame, and excessive possessiveness or 
protectiveness (Barber, 1996; Becker, 1964; Schaefer, 1965), is a social factor thought to 
influence childhood anxiety.  Studies have shown that psychological control is a significant 
predictor of internalizing problems in youth (Barber & Olsen, 1997; Eccles, Early, Frasier, 
Belansky, & McCarthy, 1997; Olsen et al., 2002).  Parental over-control in general (i.e., also 
including behavioral control, which is simply the attempt to manage children’s behaviors) may 
prevent children from facing fearful events, an important task that gives children practice in 
facing their fears, as well as giving the message that certain stimuli are threatening and 
13 
potentially harmful, which may reinforce a child’s anxiety (Rapee, 1997; Rapee, Wignall, 
Hudson, & Schniering, 2000; Vasey & Ollendick, 2000).  
In addition, a child’s relationships with both parents and peers have an effect on the 
child’s self-perception and perceived competence (Cole, Jacquez, & Maschman, 2001; Cole, 
Maxwell, & Martin, 1997).  A child’s view of his or her competence in facing stressful or 
anxiety-provoking situations, for example, can be influential in the experience of anxiety.  As 
will be discussed in detail later, the idea of not being able to cope with stressors because of 
perceived personal incompetence is a part of what makes anxiety a “problem” (Weems, 
Silverman, Rapee, & Pina, 2003).  Furthermore, social groups are typically very important to 
children and research has found that peer rejection is commonly associated with a range of 
indicators of emotional distress, such as anxiety, anger, and depressive symptoms (see 
Sandstrom & Zakriski, 2004). Longitudinal research has shown that chronic rejection in middle 
childhood predicted subsequent internalizing symptoms six years later (Burks, Dodge, & Price, 
1995).   
Regarding the more specific association between social factors and cognitive distortions, 
it seems plausible that when surrounded by anxious parents, siblings, or friends, a child’s 
attention may repeatedly be drawn to threat cues.  And, a child may more readily interpret 
neutral stimuli as dangerous when observing others do the same (Muris & Field, 2008).  Parents 
with anxiety problems themselves may display cognitive biases which are then transferred to 
their children (Hadwin, Garner, & Perez-Olivas, 2006).  Research in this area has shown that 
children of panic-disorder patients made more anxious interpretations of ambiguous situations 
compared to children in a control group (Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, & Margraf, 2002), 
children of agoraphobic parents were more fearful, anxious and had a decreased sense of control 
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over various risks relative to comparison children (Capps, Sigman, Sena, Henker, & Whalen, 
1996), and in non-clinical populations, maternal and child threat-related cognitions were 
correlated (Creswell & O’Connor, 2006; Creswell, O’Connor, & Brewin, 2006).  Thus, the 
evidence suggests that the people in a child’s environment have an effect, in various ways, on the 
development of cognitive biases.  Social factors, biological factors, and behavioral factors 
associated with anxiety have each been studied separately but often do not operate in isolation.  
These processes, along with cognitive processes, can interact in many complex ways to put an 
individual at risk for pathological anxiety.      
Cognitive Basis 
 Cognitive models suggest that anxiety disorders can originate from faulty or biased ways 
of thinking and the biased processing of information (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962).  Beck, 
Emery, and Greenberg (1985) proposed that dysfunctional cognition is the core feature of 
emotional disorders.  Over the past few decades, cognitive factors have been a focus in anxiety 
disorder interventions.  As mentioned previously, a main goal in CBT is to identify and change 
anxiety producing cognitions (Kendall, 1994).  This assumes that an anxious person’s cognitions 
or thought processes are somehow defective and need to be fixed.  The efficacy of cognitive 
behavioral interventions for treating anxiety disorders in children and adolescents points to the 
idea that addressing maladaptive cognitions in anxious youth is beneficial in improving the 
symptoms of anxiety.  A better understanding of the unique cognitive processes exhibited by 
anxious youth may help to enhance the efficacy of CBT.    
Additionally, as mentioned previously, there are biological factors, behavioral learning 
factors, and social factors that are related to the origins of cognitive biases in children.  The 
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cognitive factors implicated in the origin of childhood anxiety disorders are discussed in detail in 
the following section.   
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III. Cognitive Processes 
It has been suggested that understanding the way that children process information, such 
as attending to certain stimuli, interpreting events, and recalling past experiences can help to 
clarify the etiology of anxiety disorders (Weems & Watts, 2005).  In investigating the origins of 
anxiety, researchers have questioned if cognitions truly cause anxiety disorders.  If the primary 
pathology in anxiety is maladaptive cognitive processing, does this imply that cognitions cause 
anxiety disorders?  Beck and colleagues (1985) have proposed that this is an idea “just as 
illogical as an assertion that hallucinations cause schizophrenia” (p.85).  It may be that just as 
anxiety in general is a dysregulation of the normal response system, an anxious individual’s 
cognitive system is dysregulated, which causes him to interpret ambiguous stimuli in a 
threatening way (Beck et al., 1985).  Kendall (1985) proposed that this chronic over-activity 
focuses information processing resources on threat-relevant information, which leads to the 
development of cognitive biases.  These faulty cognitions occur more frequently and become 
more established over time and, consequently, the anxiety response system is continually, 
unnecessarily activated.  Furthermore, cognitive biases may interact with the physiological 
symptoms of anxiety (caused by activating the anxiety response system) to produce the negative 
affective symptoms of anxiety (Alfano et al., 2002).  Beck and colleagues (1985) explained that 
the main problem in the anxiety disorders is “the overactive cognitive patterns relevant to danger 
that are continually structuring external and/or internal experiences as a sign of danger” (p. 15; 
Beck, 1971).   
The research literature is building with more support for the association between 
cognitive factors and childhood anxiety (e.g., Bogels & Zigterman, 2000; Chorpita, Albano, & 
Barlow, 1996; Kendall & Chansky, 1991; Reid, Salmon, & Lovibond, 2006; Weems, Berman, 
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Silverman, & Saavedra, 2001; Weems et al.,2003).  There are various stages of cognitive 
processing that may be relevant to anxiety.  Children encounter many different kinds of 
situations that require an appropriate response.  In order to produce an appropriate response, the 
stimuli in a situation are scanned and encoded, with the aim of attending to relevant cues while 
ignoring irrelevant stimuli.  The next stage of interpretation involves evaluating the encoded 
stimuli and giving them meaning (Muris & Field, 2008).  If the child interprets the situation as 
dangerous, he or she may experience anxiety, as expressed in physiological, affective, and 
behavioral symptoms (Muris & Field, 2008).    
In general, two basic modes of processing can be distinguished—automatic and 
controlled (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  Automatic processing occurs very quickly, is 
unintentional, and occurs outside of conscious awareness.  A type of biased automatic processing 
that is associated with anxiety is selective attention, which involves hyperattention towards 
potentially threatening material.  A predisposition for selectively attending to potentially 
threatening stimuli is thought to characterize anxious individuals and may maintain anxiety by 
allocating significantly more processing resources towards threat-related material (Mathews, 
1990).  Research studies have demonstrated a link between childhood anxiety and selective 
attention (e.g, Dalgleish et al., 2003; Vasey & Daleiden, 1996; Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & 
Brown, 1995; Vasey, El-Hag, & Daleiden, 1996).    
Controlled processing, on the other hand, is slower, deliberate, and available to conscious 
awareness.  One type of controlled processing is memory bias, which refers to enhanced memory 
for information about danger.  In relation to anxiety, this would entail recall of memories 
connected with the cause of one’s anxiety, which influences a biased evaluation of current 
situations (Muris & Field, 2008).  Memory biases have been shown in research studies to be 
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associated with anxiety problems in children and adolescents (Daleiden, 1998; Moradi, Taghavi, 
Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000).  A second type of controlled processing implicated in 
anxious cognitions is interpretation bias.  This refers to the tendency to attach threatening 
meaning to neutral or ambiguous stimuli.  Research has shown that clinically anxious youth are 
more likely to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening compared to nonanxious control 
youth (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Bogels & Zigterman, 2000; Chorpita et al., 1996; 
Dineen & Hadwin, 2004; Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000).  A third 
type of controlled processing is judgment bias.  This type of biased thinking involves negative 
and/or lowered estimates of one’s coping ability (Weems & Watts, 2005).  An anxious child is 
thought to have lowered expectations of his or her ability to deal with threatening situations.  
Common definitions of control (in relation to anxiety) involve a judgment of one’s coping ability 
and have, therefore, been a common way to study judgment biases (Barlow, 2002; Capps et al., 
1996; Cortez & Bugental, 1995; Granger, Weisz, & Kauneckis, 1994; Muris, Schouten, 
Meesters, & Gijsbers, 2003).  Empirical research has demonstrated the importance of control 
cognitions in understanding pathological anxiety in children and adolescents (Ginsberg, Lambert, 
& Drake, 2004; Weems et al., 2003).   
The two different modes of processing—automatic and controlled—have implications for 
the assessment of cognitive biases.  Automatic processes are usually evaluated with reaction-
time paradigms (e.g., modified Stroop task; dot-probe task).  Controlled processes, in contrast, 
are easily assessed with self-report based measures (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 
2004).  
Weems and Watts (2005) developed a cognitive model of childhood anxiety, which 
proposes that attention biases encourage the encoding of threat-related stimuli into memory, 
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thereby increasing the amount of negatively biased threat-related memories.  Memory biases are 
then incorporated into cognitive schemas and promote interpretive and judgment biases, due to a 
biased memory base used to interpret events (Weems & Watts, 2005).   
 Attention biases and memory biases are conceptually distinct and research has shown that 
they are uniquely related to anxiety in children (Watts and Weems, 2006).  Interpretive biases 
and judgment biases, on the other hand, are not quite as distinct.  Interpretive bias involves the 
tendency to interpret neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening.  Judgment bias involves a 
negative and/or lowered estimate of one’s ability to cope (e.g., the belief that one will not be able 
to deal with a threatening situation).  Interpreting an external event negatively and interpreting 
personal capabilities negatively, for example, seem very similar.  Weems and colleagues have 
proposed that both interpretive and judgment biases involve a similar cognitive style and, 
therefore, individuals who interpret events in a negatively biased way are likely to judge their 
own abilities negatively and vice versa (Weems & Watts, 2005).  In order to measure these 
biases separately, the present study will utilize the conceptual definitions that judgment biases 
imply a believed lack of competence and are thus centered on the individual, while interpretive 
biases, which entail faulty, negative interpretations of stimuli, are centered on a context, 
situation, or external event (Weems & Watts, 2005).  Preliminary research has provided evidence 
that interpretive biases and judgment biases are conceptually distinct (Weems, Costa, Watts, 
Taylor, & Cannon, 2007).  The remainder of this dissertation and the empirical study described 
focuses on what have been termed interpretive and judgment biases that have been implicated in 
childhood anxiety disorders; and, it aims to add to the empirical literature on these biases.   
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Interpretive Biases 
Theoretical Basis 
Interpretive bias involves the tendency to interpret neutral stimuli in a negative way 
(Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962).  These interpretations are not usually justified by the given 
information in a situation.  The thinking of an anxious person is taken over by themes of danger 
and attention is fixed to stimuli perceived as threatening (Beck et al., 1985).  Beck, Rush, Shaw, 
and Emery (1979) proposed seven typical cognitive distortions involving interpretation bias: 
overgernalization (believing that a single negative outcome represents the outcomes of all 
similar future events), selective abstraction (selectively focusing on only the negative features of 
a situation in the belief that only the negative features matter), assuming excessive responsibility 
or personal causality (blaming oneself for all bad things), predicting without sufficient evidence 
(believing that if something bad happened in the past, bad things will always happen), making 
self-references (believing oneself, especially one’s negative characteristics or failures, to be the 
center of everyone’s attention), catastrophizing (expecting the worst possible outcome), and 
thinking dichotomously (viewing everything in extremes such as safe or unsafe).  It should be 
noted that the “selective abstraction” cognitive distortion mentioned here refers to consciously 
paying attention to negative or potentially threatening stimuli, rather than the automatic process 
of selective attention mentioned earlier.   
Lefebvre (1980, 1981) devised a measure to evaluate each of the seven cognitive errors 
described by Beck et al. (1979) in adults; however, in an initial study it was found that certain 
errors had considerable overlap.  As a result, some errors were combined and a list of four 
reliably discriminative error categories was produced.  These include: (1) catastrophizing 
(expecting an outcome to be catastrophic or misinterpreting an event as a catastrophe), (2) 
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overgeneralizing (combines Beck et al.’s overgeneralizing and predicting without sufficient 
evidence, and involves the belief that the outcome of a single experience will apply to a similar 
experience in the future), (3) personalizing (combines Beck et al.’s excessive responsibility and 
self-reference, and involves taking personal responsibility for negative events or giving personal 
meaning to such events), and (4) selective abstraction (combines Beck et al.’s selective 
abstraction and dichotomous thinking, and is defined as selectively focusing on the negative 
aspects of experiences).  Lefebvre (1980, 1981) used hypothetical vignettes in his questionnaire 
followed by a negative interpretation of the vignette representing one of the cognitive distortions.  
Subjects were asked to rate on a 5-point scale how similar their own thoughts would be in that 
situation.  Leitenberg, Yost, and Carroll-Wilson (1986) developed the Children’s Negative 
Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CNCEQ), modeled after Lefebvre’s Adult Cognitive Error 
Questionnaire.  The CNCEQ has been shown to be a well-validated measure for assessing 
negative interpretation biases in youth (Leitenberg et al., 1986).  Existing research on negative 
cognitive errors using the CNCEQ has shown that they are associated with symptoms of anxiety 
(Epkins, 1996; Leitenberg et al., 1986; Weems et al., 2001).     
Research Involving Interpretive Biases in Youth 
As noted above, previous research has consistently found that interpretive biases are 
correlated with anxiety in youth (Barrett, Rapee et al., 1996; Chorpita et al., 1996; Epkins, 1996; 
Leitenberg et al., 1986; Taghavi et al., 2000; Watts and Weems, 2006; Weems et al., 2001; 
Weems et al., 2007).  However, results have not always provided clear evidence that interpretive 
biases are indicative of childhood anxiety disorders and can serve to differentiate these youth 
from non-anxious youth.  Barrett and colleagues (Barrett, Rapee et al., 1996) examined the 
interpretation of ambiguous situations (referring to physical threats and social threats) in anxious 
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children, oppositional children, and normal children.  Results indicated that the youth with 
anxiety disorders interpreted neutral situations as significantly more threatening compared to 
normal children, but the oppositional children exhibited significantly more threat perception bias 
than both of the other groups (Barrett, Rapee et al., 1996).     
In a similar vein, Spence, Donovan, & Brechman-Toussaint (1999) assessed cognitive 
processes in a sample of children with social phobia compared to a control group.  The authors 
assessed interpretive biases related to performance on a social-evaluative task and found that 
group differences on expectations of negative social outcomes were nonsignificant; however, 
socially phobic children were less likely to expect positive social outcomes.  Thus, it is not 
conclusive whether these children experience a specifically negative cognitive style.   
Also similar to Spence et al. (1999), Bogels and Zigterman (2000) examined interpretive 
biases among children diagnosed with separation anxiety, social phobia, or generalized anxiety 
disorder, compared to normal children and children with an externalizing disorder.  Participants 
were asked to give their interpretations of ambiguous stories (concerning separation, social, and 
generalized anxiety situations) in open and closed responses, and their thoughts and judgments of 
the situations were assessed.  Results indicated that youth with an anxiety disorder reported 
significantly more negative cognitions than children with externalizing disorders, which is in 
contrast to the results of Barrett, Rapee et al. (1996).  Results also showed that anxious youth did 
not exhibit significantly more negative cognitions than normal children.  Moreover, on the open 
responses, anxious children did not make more overestimations of danger relative to both 
comparison groups.  On the closed responses, however, anxious children did judge the situations 
as more dangerous compared to both control groups.   
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In sum, these three studies (Barrett, Rapee et al., 1996; Bogels and Zigterman, 2000; 
Spence et al., 1999) provide some evidence but do not make it clear that the tendency toward 
interpretive biases will distinguish anxiety disordered youth from non-anxious children.  
Moreover, each of these studies used somewhat idiosyncratic ways to assess biases and the 
procedures were not standardized (i.e., these three studies [Barrett, Rapee et al., 1996; Spence et 
al., 1999; Bogels and Zigterman, 2000] did not use a measure like the Children’s Negative 
Cognitive Error Questionnaire [CNCEQ; Leitenberg et al., 1986], nor did they use matched 
comparison samples).  In the current study, interpretive biases are operationalized as negative 
cognitive errors using the CNCEQ.   
In terms of studies using the CNCEQ, Weems and colleagues (2001) examined CNCEQ 
scores in youth with various anxiety disorders and found that each of the cognitive errors (i.e., 
catastrophizing, overgeneralization, personalizing, and selective abstraction) were significantly 
correlated with self-reported anxiety.  The authors further tested the associations by controlling 
for depression and found that catastrophizing, overgeneralization, and personalizing were still 
correlated with two different measures of anxious symptoms while controlling for depression 
(Weems et al., 2001).     
In two additional studies, Watts and Weems (2006) and Weems et al. (2007) used the 
CNCEQ to assess interpretive biases in community samples of youth.  Results from both studies 
indicated that interpretive biases were significantly associated with self-reported anxiety 
symptoms.  However, these studies did not include clinically anxious children and, thus, the 
issue of the discriminant ability of the CNCEQ was not examined.    
Age and gender differences were examined in the original study in which the CNCEQ 
was developed.  Leitenberg and colleagues (1986) reported no significant main effect for gender 
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on the CNCEQ total score.  The authors did, however, find age differences on the total CNCEQ 
score.  They reported that the younger children (fourth graders) scored significantly higher on the 
CNCEQ compared to both sixth graders and eighth graders.  The sixth graders and eighth graders 
were not significantly different from each other on the CNCEQ.              
In addition to main effects, there is some evidence that age and gender may play a role in 
the association between CNCEQ scores and anxiety.  For example, Weems et al. (2001) 
examined whether age and gender moderate the association between interpretive biases (as 
measured by the CNCEQ) and anxiety (as measured by the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety 
Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978) and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory for 
Children—Trait Version (STAIC-T; Speilberger, 1973)) in a clinic referred sample of youth with 
anxiety disorders.  Regression analyses were used to test if the association between CNCEQ 
scores and self-reported anxiety was moderated by age and results were consistent with age 
serving as a moderator.  Overall, cognitive errors were more strongly related to anxiety levels in 
older youth.  However, they did not find that gender moderated the link between self-reported 
anxiety and CNCEQ scores.   
Weems et al. (2007) tested age and gender moderation in a similar way in a community 
sample of youth.  In examining the relationships between each of the four cognitive errors 
measured by the CNCEQ and self-reported anxiety symptoms (as measured by the Revised Child 
Anxiety and Depression scale (RCADS; Chorpita, Yim, Moffitt, Umemoto, & Francis, 2000), 
they found that neither gender nor age moderated any of these relationships.   
Summary.  The data regarding interpretive biases in youth suggest that these biases are 
associated with anxious symptoms.  However, the literature is unclear in terms of if a tendency 
toward interpretive biases is a distinctive feature of anxiety disorders in childhood and can 
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discriminate clinically anxious youth from non-anxious youth.  First, there have been few studies 
to examine this in youth with anxiety disorders compared to non-anxious youth.  Moreover, the 
studies that have examined this issue tended to use idiosyncratic ways of assessing biases and did 
not match on demographic variables (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity).  This pattern of findings has 
led some researchers to question whether negative cognitive biases are truly indicative of 
clinically anxious youth (Alfano et al., 2002).  Thus, it is theoretically important to determine the 
salience of CNCEQ scores in childhood anxiety disorders given the lack of clear findings and 
practically important because modifying cognitive errors is often a focus of treatment with 
anxious youth.  Furthermore, it has been suggested by previous research that age may affect 
performance on the CNCEQ.  It is unclear whether gender could affect scores on the CNCEQ.  
The present study uses the CNCEQ to test if the tendency toward interpretive biases is a 
distinctive characteristic of youth with anxiety disorders and if age and gender influence the 
relationship between CNCEQ scores and anxiety disorder status.          
Judgment Biases 
Theoretical Basis 
As mentioned previously, researchers have proposed that both interpretive and judgment 
biases involve a similar cognitive style and, thus, individuals who interpret events in a negatively 
biased way are likely to judge their own abilities negatively and vice versa (Weems & Watts, 
2005; Weems et al., 2007).  Judgment biases in children involve lowered expectations of their 
ability to cope with threatening situations or events.  For example, self-efficacy is the judgment 
of one’s competence.  Self-efficacy involves one’s beliefs about the ability to successfully carry 
out behaviors that regulate life experiences (Bandura, 1977; 1982; Bandura, Adams, Hardy, & 
Howells, 1980).  Self-efficacy is thought to have an effect on anxiety by fostering the cognitive 
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sense of control (Bandura, 1982).  There have been some research studies to document the 
association between self-efficacy and anxiety.  Yue (1996) found that self-efficacy was 
negatively correlated with test anxiety in a sample of junior high-school students.  In another 
study, Messer and Beidel (1994) demonstrated that children with anxiety disorders had 
significantly lower scores on the Perceived Competence Scale for Children (Harter, 1982) 
compared to normal children.       
In general, control involves a judgment of one’s coping abilities and has often been used 
as a way to measure judgment biases (see Weems et al., 2007 for an expanded discussion of 
conceptual distinctions).  Barlow’s (1988; 2002) model of anxiety proposes that a perceived lack 
of control over external threats (i.e., events, objects, or situations that are fear producing) and/or 
negative internal emotional and bodily reactions is a major part of why anxiety is a “problem” 
(Weems et al., 2003).  In other words, not having control over the situations and physical 
sensations associated with anxiety is typically distressing and problematic for individuals.  The 
judgment of a situation when one is in control of the object/event and one’s physical reaction 
would likely be very different from the experience of feeling helpless and not able to regulate 
one’s heart rate, sweating, shaking, etc.   
Research Involving Judgment Biases 
Rapee, Craske, Brown, and Barlow (1996) examined the concept of control in adult 
samples using the Anxiety Control Questionnaire (ACQ) and found that low perceptions of 
control over external threats and internal anxious symptoms are correlated with elevated self-
reported anxiety.  They also found that individuals with diagnosed anxiety disorders had lower 
perceptions of control compared to nonreferred individuals (Rapee et al., 1996).   
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In order to study the concept of control in children and adolescents, Weems and 
colleagues (2003) modified the ACQ and developed the Anxiety Control Questionnaire for 
Children (ACQ-C).  The ACQ-C is a 30-item self-report questionnaire in which children are 
asked to rate their agreement with each question.  Approximately half of the questions assess 
lack of control over external threats, while the other half assess control over negative, internal 
emotional reactions associated with anxiety.  The authors found that clinically anxious children 
had lower perceived control over external threats and lower perceived control over their internal 
emotional reactions compared to non-anxious children (Weems et al., 2003).  Additionally, the 
authors found that anxiety control beliefs predicted anxiety disorder status while controlling for 
general anxiety symptoms (i.e., RCMAS scores) and another measure of control (i.e., the 
Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale [NSLOC; Nowicki & Strickland, 1973]).  This study 
suggests that a perceived lack of control is a significant part of the experience of anxiety (Weems 
et al., 2003).  In other words, pathological anxiety, as opposed to non-pathological anxiety, 
theoretically, is characterized by elevated levels of anxiety in response to threatening situations, 
but also by the belief that those experiences are out of one’s control (Weems & Watts, 2005).  
However, the question of the distinctiveness of judgment biases versus interpretive biases was 
not addressed in Weems et al. (2003).       
In another study, Weems and colleagues (2007) have found that judgment biases 
(measured by the ACQ-C) were significantly associated with self-reported anxiety levels while 
controlling for CNCEQ scores in a community sample of youth.  ACQ-C scores also predicted 
anxiety while controlling for depression, but did not predict depression while controlling for 
anxiety (Weems et al., 2007).  While this is an important finding, this study used a community 
sample and, thus, the incremental validity of the ACQ-C and CNCEQ in predicting anxiety 
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disorder status was not assessed.  Further research is needed to understand whether ACQ-C 
scores and CNCEQ scores will both incrementally predict anxiety disorder status.   
In regards to the effects of age and gender, Weems et al. (2003), in a sample of youth 
with anxiety disorders, found that ACQ-C scores predicted anxiety disorder status and that this 
relationship was not influenced by either age or gender.  In another study, Weems et al. (2007) 
found that neither age nor gender affected the relationship between ACQ-C scores and self-
reported anxiety symptoms in a community sample of youth.   
Summary.  Judgment biases do seem to be related to anxiety problems in youth.  With the 
exception of Weems et al. (2003), there have been no other studies to assess anxiety-related 
judgment biases in clinically anxious children.  Additional research is needed to determine the 
importance of this construct in the experience of anxiety and whether it should be more of a 
focus in interventions for anxiety disorders.  Furthermore, the limited research suggests that 
performance on the ACQ-C is not affected by age and gender, but more support is needed and 
this issue is explored in the present study.   
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IV. The Present Study 
To summarize the extant research, there is evidence to support that both interpretive 
biases (measured with the CNCEQ) and judgment biases (measured with the ACQ-C) are related 
to levels of self-reported anxiety symptoms in youth (Epkins, 1996; Leitenberg et al., 1986; 
Leung & Wong, 1998; Watts & Weems, 2006; Weems et al., 2001; Weems et al., 2003; Weems 
et al., 2007).  However, it is unclear if CNCEQ scores and limited evidence that ACQ-C scores 
discriminate clinically anxious youth from non-anxious youth.  Theoretically, the two are distinct 
cognitive features of anxiety disorders (Beck, 1976; Barlow, 2002; Weems & Watts, 2005) and 
evidence suggests that they each incrementally predict self-reported anxious symptoms in youth 
(Weems et al., 2007).  However, research is needed to examine if CNCEQ scores and ACQ-C 
scores independently discriminate clinically anxious youth from non-anxious youth as predicted 
by theory (Barlow, 2001; Beck, 1976; Weems & Watts, 2005).     
Furthermore, research is needed to determine if CNCEQ scores and ACQ-C scores can 
predict anxiety disorder status beyond that predicted by anxiety symptoms alone.  Theoretically, 
interpretive and judgment biases are a unique facet of anxiety disorders.  That is, an anxiety 
disorder has cognitive, behavioral (e.g., avoidance), and affective (e.g., anxious affect) 
components; so, CNCEQ scores and ACQ-C scores might predict anxiety disorder beyond levels 
of anxiety symptoms (and other emotional and behavioral symptoms).  Lastly, there have been 
mixed findings from the literature with regards to the role of child age and child gender.  
Specifically, research has found evidence for age moderating the association between anxiety 
and CNCEQ scores in clinic samples of anxious youth (Weems et al., 2001), but not in 
community samples (Weems et al., 2007).  Research comparing youth meeting diagnostic 
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criteria for anxiety disorders with non-referred youth may help clarify if (and how) age and 
gender influence the association between CNCEQ and ACQ-C scores and anxiety.   
Hypotheses 
 It is hypothesized that (1) CNCEQ and ACQ-C scores will show that youth with anxiety 
disorders will have a greater tendency toward interpretive biases and lower perceived anxiety-
related control (judgment biases) compared to the control sample.  That is, youth meeting 
diagnostic criteria for anxiety disorders should, theoretically, have a significantly higher mean 
score on the CNCEQ and a significantly lower mean score on the ACQ-C relative to the control 
sample.  It is also hypothesized that (2) CNCEQ scores and ACQ-C scores will each demonstrate 
incremental validity over each other in predicting diagnostic status given the theoretical 
uniqueness of the two constructs.  Next, it is hypothesized that (3) the CNCEQ and ACQ-C will 
predict diagnostic status beyond measures of general anxiety, depression, and externalizing 
symptoms.  Lastly, (4) analyses will test whether age and gender moderate the associations 
between diagnostic status and the two cognitive biases.             
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Method 
Participants 
 The sample for the current study was drawn from the database of the Youth and Family 
Stress, Phobia, and Anxiety Research Laboratory at the University of New Orleans.  Children in 
the clinic sample were referred from various sources including area schools and mental health 
clinics and from screenings conducted in the research laboratory.  From this subject pool, 24 
participants met criteria to comprise the anxiety disorder group.  These children each have an 
anxiety disorder as the primary diagnosis or an anxiety disorder and an externalizing disorder as 
the comorbid primary diagnoses, as assessed by the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for 
DSM-IV (ADIS).  That is, each diagnosed disorder is given a “Clinician Severity Rating,” which 
is based on the interviewer’s clinical judgment and the information obtained from the child and 
parent, and most of these youth (75%) have an anxiety disorder considered the most clinically 
“severe,” relative to other diagnoses (Albano & Silverman, 1996).  Six children (25%) have an 
anxiety disorder and an externalizing disorder with equal severity ratings.1
  
  Diagnoses of the 
clinic sample are delineated in Table 1.  All but one child in the clinic sample had comorbid 
diagnoses.  The average number of anxiety disorders met was 3.  The first half of Table 1 
classifies all clinic youth (n = 24) in terms of clusters of diagnoses (i.e., anxiety disorders, 
externalizing disorders, affective disorders).  The second half of Table 1 lists the number of 
clinic youth who met criteria for each disorder evaluated by the ADIS.      
                                                          
1 These 6 youth did not differ from other youth in the clinic sample on any of the measures used in the present 
study (i.e., CNCEQ, ACQ-C, RCADS-GAD, CBCL internalizing and externalizing scales, RCMAS, and CDI); and, the 
main analyses of the study were run excluding these youth and the pattern of results remained the same.  
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Table 1. Diagnoses of the clinic sample 
 
Clinic Sample (n = 24)  
Anxiety disorder(s) only 3  (12.5%) 
Anxiety and externalizing disorder(s) 11  (45.8%) 
Anxiety and an affective disorder 1  (4.2%) 
Anxiety and externalizing disorder(s) and an  affective disorder 9  (37.5%) 
  
Number of youth meeting diagnosis for:  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder  19  (79.2%) 
Specific Phobia 16  (66.7%) 
Social Phobia 14  (58.3%) 
Separation Anxiety Disorder 11  (45.8%) 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 6  (25.0%) 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 4  (16.7%) 
Panic Disorder 2  (8.3%) 
Agoraphobia 1  (4.2%) 
   
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 19  (79.2%) 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder 6  (25.0%) 
Conduct Disorder 0   
   
Dysthymia  7  (29.2%) 
Major Depressive Disorder 3  (12.5%) 
Note: Externalizing disorder(s) includes Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder or Oppositional defiant 
disorder. Affective disorder includes Major depressive disorder or Dysthymia.   
  
 Each child in the clinic sample (n = 24) was matched with two controls, thus the control 
sample is comprised of 48 participants.  Youth in the control sample were recruited for a study 
on youth feelings and emotions (e.g., Weems & Costa, 2005; Cannon & Weems, 2006). 
Participants received a small monetary reward as compensation for participating in the research 
study.  Children were excluded if parents indicated that the child had a history of one or more of 
the following diagnoses—all pervasive developmental disorders, mental retardation, selective 
mutism, organic mental disorders, schizophrenia, and other psychotic disorders, or were at risk 
for harm to self or others.  Furthermore, in order to be included in the control sample for the 
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present study, youth had to have scores on the internalizing and externalizing scales of the Child 
Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 1991) in the non-clinical range.   
 The variables used to match participants were age, gender, ethnicity, and family income 
level.  When possible, a clinic youth was matched to two control youth with exactly matching 
age, gender, ethnicity, and family income level.  When exact matches were not available, clinic 
youth were matched to control youth who were as similar as possible on the four demographic 
variables.  Gender was matched exactly for all clinic cases.  Age was matched exactly for all but 
two clinic cases (a 12-year-old female who was matched with a 13-year-old female of the same 
race and a 7-year-old male who was matched with an 8-year-old male of the same race).  Race 
was matched exactly in the majority of cases (both samples were composed of mostly Black or 
White participants).  When family income level, which was denoted by a choice of six levels of 
income, was not matched exactly, the next closest available level was chosen for a match.   Both 
samples are comprised of children ages 7-17 and one parent for each child (father or mother).  
The mean age of the clinic sample is 11 years and of the control sample is 11 years.  The 
demographics of each sample are described in Table 2.  As shown, matching produced very 
homogeneous groups in terms of demographics with only slight variation in income; no 
differences approached statistical significance.   
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Table 2. Demographic information for the clinic and control samples 
 
  Clinic Sample, n = 24 (%) Control Sample, n = 48 (%) 
    
Age 7-11 years old 54.2 54.2 
 12-17 years old 45.8 45.8 
    
    
Sex Female 54.2 54.2 
 Male 45.8 45.8 
    
    
Ethnicity Black 29.2 33.3 
 White 58.3 58.3 
 Hispanic 0 2.1 
 Other 12.5 6.2 
    
    
Family  $0 - $11,999 16.7 12.5 
Income  $12,000 - $20,999 4.2 8.3 
Level $21,000 - $30,999 12.5 25.0 
 $31,000 - $40,999 12.5 6.2 
 $41,000 - $50,999 29.2 12.5 
 Over $51,000  25 35.4 
 
Measures  
 The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV: Child and Parent versions 
(ADIS-C and ADIS-P, respectively; Silverman & Albano, 1996) was administered to all children 
and parents in the clinic sample to determine diagnostic status.  The ADIS-C and ADIS-P are 
semistructured interviews focused on the anxiety disorders, but do allow for the assessment and 
diagnosis of other major childhood disorders, including the externalizing and affective disorders, 
according to DSM-IV criteria.  The authors of the ADIS recommend administration of both the 
child and parent interviews in order to obtain a composite diagnosis (Albano & Silverman, 
1996).  The interviewer assesses diagnostic criteria of each disorder as well as an “interference” 
rating, in which the interviewee rates the level of functional impairment that the disorder is 
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presently causing on a scale from 0 (the disorder has not interfered in the child’s life) to 8 (the 
disorder has interfered very, very much).  For each of the diagnoses met, the interviewer assigns 
a “Clinician Severity Rating” on the same scale from 0 to 8 based on clinical judgment and the 
degree of interference.   
 The diagnostic interviews were conducted by either a post-doctoral psychologist or 
advanced graduate students in psychology.  All graduate students who conducted interviews had 
completed at least two graduate-level courses in psychological assessment.  Diagnosticians were 
trained by observing videotaped interviews and were required to arrive at 100% agreement on at 
least two observed interviews before conducting an ADIS on their own.  For the current study, 
25% of the clinic sample (n = 6) was examined for reliability of the diagnoses.  An interviewer 
blind to the diagnostic status of the child watched the full videotaped interview and coded a copy 
of the ADIS for diagnoses.  The agreement between two interviewers on anxiety disorder and 
other diagnoses on these cases was 100%.     
 The Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CNCEQ; Leitenberg et al., 
1986) was used to measure interpretive biases.  The CNCEQ is a 24-item measure with items to 
assess cognitive errors—namely, catastrophizing, overgeneralization, personalizing, and 
selective abstraction.  It assesses the four errors using four theoretically derived subscales, with 
each subscale containing six items.  The CNCEQ can be used to obtain a “total cognitive 
distortion score” as well as subscale scores for each type of cognitive error (Leitenberg et al., 
1986).  Each item proposes a hypothetical vignette and a negative interpretation of the vignette.  
The child is asked if he or she would interpret the hypothetical situation in the same way (i.e., 
would he or she interpret the situation in a negatively biased way?).  The child rates on a five-
point scale how similar the thought is to his/her own thought in response to the vignette.  Item 
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content covers three contexts—academic, social, and athletic—in each subscale (i.e., a 6-item 
subscale will contain two academic vignettes, two social vignettes, and two athletic vignettes).  
Leitenberg et al. (1986) computed reliability and internal consistency for the CNCEQ in a 
sample of 143 children in grades five through eight.  Four-week test-retest reliability for the 
CNCEQ total score was determined to be .65 (p<.001; Leitenberg et al., 1986).  The authors 
reported internal consistency for the CNCEQ total score, using Cronbach’s alpha, as .89 
(Leitenberg et al., 1986).  In terms of convergent validity, Weems et al. (2001) found that each of 
the four subscales of the CNCEQ was significantly correlated with two self-report measures of 
anxious symptoms in a sample of children with anxiety disorders: the State-Trait Anxiety Scale 
for Children—Trait version (STAIC-T; Speilberger, 1973), r’s ranging from .39 to .42 (p<.01); 
and, the Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978), 
r’s ranging from .36 to .43 (p<.01).  In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for the CNCEQ total 
scale was .87 for the clinic sample and .89 for the control sample.    
The Anxiety Control Questionnaire—child form (ACQ-C; Weems et al., 2003) is a 
developmentally adapted version of the Anxiety Control Questionnaire (Rapee et al., 1996), a 
measure of control in anxiety disorders used with adults.  The ACQ-C was used to assess 
perceived lack of control over external threats (e.g., feared objects or situations) and control over 
negative, internal, emotional, and bodily reactions associated with anxiety (e.g., heart racing, 
trembling).  In the current study, judgment biases are operationalized as anxiety control beliefs 
using the ACQ-C.  Children rate their agreement on a 5-point scale with each of the thirty items 
assessing control-related self-competencies.  An example item is “When I am in a place that gets 
me nervous or afraid, I can take charge over and control my feelings.”  Weems et al. (2003) 
reported internal consistency estimates of the ACQ-C, using Cronbach’s alpha, to be .94 and .93 
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in two independent samples.  Additionally, the ACQ-C demonstrated convergent validity with 
the RCMAS (r = -.47, p<.01) and the Nowicki-Strickland Locus of Control Scale (NSLOC; 
Nowicki & Strickland, 1973), one of the most widely used measures of locus of control in 
children (r = -.22, p<.05).  In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for the ACQ-C was .94 for the 
clinic sample and .95 for the control sample.         
 The Revised Child Anxiety and Depression scale (RCADS; Chorpita et al., 2000) was 
used to measure symptoms of anxiety.  The RCADS is a 47-item self-report questionnaire with 
each item scored on a 4-point scale. The symptoms measured by the RCADS are based on DSM-
IV criteria for disorders.  The authors have reported good convergent validity of the RCADS 
with other measures of childhood anxiety (Chorpita et al., 2000).  Specifically, the GAD subscale 
was used as a covariate in the present study to test if CNCEQ and ACQ-C scores predicted 
anxiety disorder status beyond anxious affect.  The GAD symptoms were used because they 
appear to best tap the general anxious affect component of anxiety disorders.  Example items 
from this subscale are, “I worry that bad things will happen to me” and “I worry that something 
awful will happen to someone in my family.”  The RCADS GAD subscale evidenced adequate 
reliability in the clinic sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .79) and the control sample (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .74) of the present study.    
 The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1978) 
was also used to assess self-reported anxiety. The RCMAS is a well-researched 37-item scale 
designed to evaluate general anxiety in children. Twenty-eight items are summed from ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ responses to yield a Total Anxiety score.  The remaining nine items make up the lie scale.  
Example items are “I worry about what is going to happen” and “Often I have trouble getting my 
breath.”  Internal consistency coefficients of the RCMAS have ranged from .80 to .90 (Paget & 
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Reynolds, 1984), and three-week test-retest reliabilities have ranged from .90 to .99 (Pela & 
Reynolds, 1982).  Reynolds (1980) reported good convergent validity of the RCMAS as 
evidenced by a significant correlation between the RCMAS and the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory for Children—trait scale (STAIC; Spielberger, 1973; r = .85, p<.001).  In the current 
study, Cronbach’s alpha for the clinic sample is .84 and for the control sample .88 on the 
RCMAS.          
 The Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovacs, 1981, 1992) was used to assess 
depressive symptoms.  It was developed from the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and it includes 27 items regarding the cognitive, 
behavioral, and affective signs of depression.  Each item has three statements from which the 
child chooses which is true for him/her.  An example item is “I hate myself,” “I do not like 
myself,” or “I like myself.”   Kovacs (1981) reported adequate internal consistency (.86) and 
one-month test-retest reliabilities (.72) for the CDI.  The scale has been well validated and it 
correlates significantly (r = .55) with clinician-rated depression (Kovacs, 1992).  The CDI was 
used as a covariate in order to control for depressive symptoms in the relationship between 
cognitive biases and anxiety disorder status.  In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for the CDI 
is .82 in the clinic sample and .83 in the control sample.      
 The Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 1991) is a parent-report measure 
designed to assess the behaviors of youth ages 2 to 18.  The internalizing scale and externalizing 
scale of the CBCL were used as covariates to test if CNCEQ scores and ACQ-C scores predicted 
diagnostic status beyond parent-reported internalizing and externalizing symptoms.  
Additionally, the internalizing and externalizing scales were used as criteria for inclusion in the 
control sample.  The mean T-score on each scale is 50, with a standard deviation of 10 
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(Achenbach, 1991).  As recommended by Achenbach, Howell, Quay, and Conners (1991), scores 
on the CBCL in the 90th percentile and above can be considered “clinical range.”  In the present 
sample, T-scores on the internalizing scale of 67 or higher and T-scores on the externalizing 
scale of 64 or higher were in the 90th percentile and, thus, considered “clinical.”  All youth in the 
control sample are below the clinical range on these two scales.  The CBCL has been widely 
used and has shown to have good reliability and validity (Achenbach, 1991).     
Procedures 
 The assessment of the cognitive variables (interpretive biases, judgment biases) and the 
behavioral/affective variables (self-reported symptoms of anxiety and depression, parent-
reported internalizing and externalizing symptoms) were the same with both the clinic and non-
clinic samples.  The child and parent were greeted and given a general overview of the 
assessment procedures.  Informed consent was obtained from the parent and informed assent 
from the child.  Standardized specific instructions were given to the child and parent separately.  
The child completed the self-report measures in a separate room from the parent and was assisted 
as necessary by trained research assistants (e.g., a research assistant may have read each question 
to a young participant while monitoring the child’s comprehension).   
 At this point, the procedures with the clinic versus control samples differed somewhat.  
Participants recruited for the control sample were finished with the assessment after the 
questionnaires were completed and were given a small monetary reward.  Participants in the 
clinic sample did not receive a monetary reward because they were referred to the research 
laboratory at UNO in order to receive a comprehensive psychological evaluation, supervised by a 
licensed psychologist, free of charge or on a sliding fee scale.  Children in the clinic sample 
continued with the assessment by taking part in the diagnostic interview—children were 
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administered the ADIS-C and parents the ADIS-P.  The diagnostic interviews, like the 
questionnaires, were completed with the parent and child in separate rooms.        
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Results 
 Before conducting the main analyses of the study, descriptive and correlational analyses 
were run.  Correlations among the cognitive measures, as well as the measures assessing anxiety, 
depression, and externalizing symptoms in the full sample are presented in Table 3. Means and 
standard deviations of all measures for the clinic sample and the control sample are presented in 
Table 4.  Examination of the scores indicated acceptable ranges on all measures for the planned 
analyses.  In addition, analyses of internal consistency were conducted.  As reported in the 
Measures section, all measures showed acceptable internal consistency.      
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Table 3.  Correlations among all measures used in the present study. 
 CNCEQ ACQ-C RCADS
-GAD 
RCMAS CBCL
-int 
CBCL
-ext 
CDI Age Sex 
          
CNCEQ          
          
ACQ-C -.33**         
          
RCADS-
GAD 
.26* -.48**        
          
RCMAS .44** -.49** .73**       
          
CBCL-
int 
.03 -.12 .05 .12      
          
CBCL-
ext 
.15 -.06 -.08 .06 .61**     
          
CDI .45** -.53** .57** .69** .24* .12    
          
Age -.25* -.01 .15 -.05 .21 .09 .08   
          
Sex -.03 -.15 .19 .12 .08 .07 .05 .37**  
*p<.05, **p<.01 
CNCEQ = Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire, ACQ-C = Anxiety Control 
Questionnaire—child form, RCADS-GAD = Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scales—Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder subscale, RCMAS = Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, CBCL-int = Child 
Behavior Checklist internalizing scale T-score, CBCL-ext = Child Behavior Checklist externalizing scale 
T-score, CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Interpretive and judgment biases—anxious vs. non-anxious youth  
 In order to test the hypothesis that the clinic sample will have a greater tendency toward 
interpretive biases (as assessed by the CNCEQ) and lower perceived anxiety-related control (as 
assessed by the ACQ-C) compared to the control sample, groups were compared using two-tailed 
independent samples t tests.  Children in the clinic sample scored higher on the CNCEQ relative 
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to control children (t(70) = 2.62, p<.05), indicating more interpretive biases.  Children in the 
clinic sample scored lower on the ACQ-C relative to control children (t(70) = -3.80, p<.001), 
indicating lower perceived anxiety-related control (i.e., more judgment biases).  Clinic children 
also scored significantly higher on measures of anxiety (RCADS-GAD and RCMAS), depression 
(CDI), and parent-reported internalizing and externalizing symptoms (CBCL internalizing and 
externalizing scales), as reported in Table 4.   
Table 4. Summary of comparisons of the clinic and control samples 
 Clinic Sample 
M (SD) 
Control Sample 
M (SD) 
 
t 
 
p 
 
Cohen’s d 
      
CNCEQ   57.20 (16.29) 46.81 (15.63) 2.62 .011 .63 
ACQ-C 51.82 (25.28) 75.71 (25.06) -3.80 .000 -.91 
RCADS—GAD   14.58 (4.38) 10.48 (3.13) 4.57 .000 1.09 
RCMAS 18.20 (5.66) 8.92 (6.27) 6.11 .000 1.46 
CBCL—internalizing  56.50 (17.36) 47.88 (9.60) 2.72 .008 .65 
CBCL—externalizing  54.75 (12.78) 48.52 (7.96)  2.54 .013 .61 
CDI 14.37 (7.61) 6.40 (5.66)  5.01 .000 1.20 
CNCEQ = Children’s Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire, ACQ-C = Anxiety Control 
Questionnaire—child form, RCADS-GAD = Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scales—Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder subscale, RCMAS = Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale, CBCL—internalizing 
= Child Behavior Checklist internalizing scale T-score, CBCL—externalizing = Child Behavior Checklist 
externalizing scale T-score, CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory. Cohen’s d, effect size statistic. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Incremental validity of CNCEQ and ACQ-C  
 Logistic regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) was used to test the hypothesis that the 
CNCEQ and ACQ-C scores would demonstrate incremental validity in predicting diagnostic 
status.  In these logistic regression models, demographics were not used as covariates because 
the samples were matched on age, gender, ethnicity, and family income level and, thus, are not 
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different on those variables.  In the analysis, anxiety disorder status was the dependent variable 
(coded as 1 for the clinic sample and 2 for the control sample), with CNCEQ scores and ACQ-C 
scores entered together as predictors.  Overall classification accuracy of the full logistic 
regression model was 76.4% and the model was significant, χ²(2) = 15.72, p<.001.  In addition, 
the ACQ-C was a significant predictor while controlling for CNCEQ scores, Wald = 7.81, p<.01.  
However, the CNCEQ was not a significant predictor while controlling for ACQ-C scores (Wald 
= 2.48, p=.12).2
 The tests of incremental validity for the CNCEQ and ACQ-C were supplemented by 
using a methodological strategy wherein the continuous measures were coded in a categorical 
manner, as this can improve results if the assumption of linearity in the logit is violated 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  While the Box-Tidwell test indicated that linearity in the logit 
could reasonably be assumed, given the lack of incremental prediction by the CNCEQ using the 
continuous scale, this supplemental test seems appropriate as a check against type 2 error.  The 
measures were coded in the same direction for consistency and clarity in reporting odds ratios 
using three broad increments.  Specifically, scores on the CNCEQ and ACQ-C were divided into 
three categories to incorporate the range of each measure (CNCEQ: (0) 73-96, (1) 49-72, (2) 24-
48; ACQ-C: (0) 0-39, (1) 40-79, (2) 80-120).  As in the previous analysis, anxiety disorder status 
was entered as the dependent variable in the logistic regression model, with the recoded CNCEQ 
and ACQ-C entered together as predictors.  Overall classification accuracy of the full model was 
73.6% and the model was significant, χ²(2) = 15.15, p<.01.  The ACQ-C again demonstrated 
incremental validity over the CNCEQ (Wald = 9.91, p<.01); but, the CNCEQ did not predict 
                  
                                                          
2 In order to explore whether the interaction of the CNCEQ and ACQ-C may be a better predictor of diagnostic 
status, an interaction term of CNCEQ scores x ACQ-C scores was entered into a sequential logistic regression 
model.  Results indicated that this interaction term did not significantly predict diagnostic status beyond that 
predicted by the CNCEQ and ACQ-C (each entered individually in the model).   
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beyond the ACQ-C (Wald = .47, p=.49).  The odds ratio for the ACQ-C in this analysis provides 
a more conceptually clear estimate—specifically, that for every 40 point decrease in ACQ-C 
scores, youth are 4.3 times more likely to be in the anxiety disorder group.     
 As a final test of the CNCEQ, subscale scores were used instead of the full scale.  The 
CNCEQ can be used to assess four types of negative cognitive errors—catastrophizing (i.e., 
expecting an outcome to be catastrophic or misinterpreting an event as a catastrophe), 
overgeneralizing (i.e., believing that a single negative outcome is representative of all similar 
future experiences), personalizing (i.e., attributing control over negative outcomes to personal 
causes), and selective abstraction (i.e., selectively focusing on the negative aspects of 
experiences).  And, these have been found to have some differentially strong associations with 
anxiety symptoms Epkins, 1996; Weems et al., 2001).   
 Four logistic regression analyses were run in which diagnostic status was used as the 
dependent variable, and the ACQ-C along with one CNCEQ subscale (at a time) were entered 
together as predictors.  In the first model, the catastrophizing subscale and ACQ-C were entered 
together as predictors and the model was significant (χ²(2) = 14.40, p<.01).  And, the ACQ-C 
(Wald = 9.26, p<.01) demonstrated incremental validity over the catastrophizing subscale (Wald 
= 1.22, p=.27).  In the second model, the overgeneralizing subscale and ACQ-C were entered as 
predictors.  Again, the model was significant (χ²(2) = 22.32, p<.001) and the ACQ-C (Wald = 
6.17, p<.05) and overgeneralizing subscale (Wald = 7.57, p<.01) were both significant 
predictors.  In the third model, the personalizing subscale and ACQ-C were entered as predictors.  
The overall model was significant (χ²(2) = 13.22, p<.01) and the ACQ-C (Wald = 9.86, p<.01) 
demonstrated incremental validity over the personalizing subscale (Wald = .03, p=.86).  In the 
fourth model, the selective abstraction subscale and ACQ-C were entered as predictors.  The 
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model was significant (χ²(2) = 14.65, p<.01) and the ACQ-C (Wald = 7.96, p<.01) demonstrated 
incremental validity over the selective abstraction subscale (Wald = 1.46, p=.23).   
 To summarize, the catastrophizing, personalizing, and selective abstraction subscales 
performed similarly to the CNCEQ total score (i.e., they did not demonstrate incremental validity 
over the ACQ-C).   The overgeneralizing subscale, on the other hand, did demonstrate 
incremental validity over the ACQ-C and both were significant predictors in the model.       
Hypothesis 3: Predicting diagnostic status beyond symptom measures 
 Given the evidence that the CNCEQ did not predict diagnostic status beyond that 
predicted by the ACQ-C, the ACQ-C was the focus of the next set of analyses.  A series of 
sequential logistic regression analyses was used to test the hypothesis that the ACQ-C would 
predict diagnostic status while controlling for several covariates.  Anxiety disorder status was 
used as the dependent variable in all five analyses.  In each separate analysis, one covariate was 
put in the first block and the ACQ-C in the second block.  Results are presented in Table 5.  To 
summarize, the ACQ-C did predict diagnostic status while controlling for Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder symptoms (RCADS-GAD subscale) and parent-reported internalizing and externalizing 
symptoms (CBCL internalizing and externalizing scales), but was not a significant predictor 
while controlling for general anxiety (RCMAS) and depression (CDI) symptoms.3
  
  
                                                          
3 Due to the large amount of comorbid externalizing diagnoses of the clinic sample, it was explored whether the 
CBCL externalizing scale may function as a moderator on the relationships between the CNCEQ and diagnostic 
status and the ACQ-C and diagnostic status.  Two sequential logistic regression analyses were run, for the CNCEQ 
and ACQ-C separately, to test whether the interaction terms (CNCEQ scores x CBCL externalizing T-scores; ACQ-C 
scores x CBCL externalizing T-scores) predicted diagnostic status beyond that predicted by the cognitive measure 
and the CBCL individually.  Results indicated that the CBCL externalizing scale was not acting as a moderator on the 
relationship between CNCEQ scores and diagnostic status, nor on the relationship between ACQ-C scores and 
diagnostic status.    
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Table 5. Summary of logistic regression analyses predicting anxiety disorder status with ACQ-C 
scores, controlling for anxiety and other symptoms  
 
 
Variables 
 
Model χ² 
 
Model p 
 
Wald 
 
Odds Ratio 
 
95% Confidence Interval 
     Lower Upper 
        
Model 1: ACQ-C predicting beyond RCADS-GAD subscale 
1. GAD 17.69 .000 12.13** .74 .62 .88 
2. GAD 22.72 .000 7.75** .77 .64 .93 
    ACQ-C   4.57* 1.03 1.00 1.06 
       
  
Model 2: ACQ-C predicting beyond CBCL internalizing scale 
1. CBCL-int 7.56 .006 6.17* .94 .90 .99 
2. CBCL-int 18.23 .000 4.33* .95 .91 1.00 
    ACQ-C   8.67** 1.04 1.01 1.06 
       
  
Model 3: ACQ-C predicting beyond CBCL externalizing scale 
1. CBCL-ext 6.18 .013 5.48* .94 .89 .99 
2. CBCL-ext 18.44 .000 4.63* .94 .89 .99 
    ACQ-C    9.70** 1.04 1.01 1.06 
       
  
Model 4: ACQ-C predicting beyond RCMAS 
1. RCMAS 28.01 .000 17.76** .80 .72 .89 
2. RCMAS 30.66 .000 12.74** .83 .74 .92 
    ACQ-C   2.54 1.02 1.00 1.05 
       
  
Model 5: ACQ-C predicting beyond CDI 
1. CDI 19.63 .000 14.41** .85 .77 .92 
2. CDI 22.35 .000 7.65** .88 .80 .96 
    ACQ-C   2.63 1.02 1.00 1.05 
       
*p<.05, **p<.01 
Note: A Wald test is used to test the statistical significance of each coefficient in the model 
Hypothesis 4: Age and gender moderation 
 The potential that age and gender may moderate the link between the cognitive measures 
and anxiety disorder status was assessed in two ways—first, using ANOVAs (dichotomizing age 
as done in previous research; e.g., Weems et al., 2001) and examining significant interactions.  
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Second, because dichotomizing age can limit the power of the analysis, moderation was also 
tested with moderated logistic regression analyses, in which age was used as a continuous 
variable.   
 Moderation—ANOVA  
 In terms of the ANOVA strategy, a 2 (clinic or control) by 2 [age group (7-11 years and 
12-17 years)] by 2 (gender) ANOVA, with the CNCEQ as the dependent variable, showed a non-
significant main effect for age (F(1, 71) = 1.88, p=.18) and for gender (F(1, 71) = 1.08, p=.30), a 
non-significant interaction between sample (clinic or control) and age group (F(1, 71) = .37, 
p=.55), and no three-way interaction (F(1, 71) = .57, p=.45).  However, there was a significant 
interaction between sample and gender (F(1, 71) = 4.66, p<.05), indicating that the relationship 
between CNCEQ scores and diagnostic status is influenced by gender.  This interaction is 
depicted in Figure 1.  To further explore this significant interaction, two two-tailed independent 
samples t tests were performed and results indicated that females in the clinic sample 
significantly differed on the CNCEQ from females in the control sample [clinic females (n = 13) 
M = 63.00 (SD = 17.85); control females (n = 26) M = 43.26 (SD = 12.11); t(37) = 4.09, p<.001].  
However, males did not differ on the CNCEQ [clinic males (n = 11) M = 50.35 (SD = 11.53); 
control males (n = 22) M = 51.00 (SD = 18.40); t(31) = -.11, p=.92].  A second 2 (clinic or 
control) by 2 (age group) by 2 (gender) ANOVA was performed with the ACQ-C as the 
dependent variable.  This analysis showed a non-significant main effect for age (F(1, 71) = .00, 
p=.95) and for gender(F(1, 71) = 1.06, p=.31), no significant interactions between sample and 
age group (F(1, 71) = .11, p=.75) or between sample and gender (F(1, 71) = .06, p=.80), and no 
three-way interaction (F(1, 71) = .20, p=.66).  
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Figure 1. CNCEQ scores by sample and gender.    
   
 Moderation—Logistic Regression 
 The moderating effects of age and gender were also tested using moderated logistic 
regression analyses.  It was examined whether age or gender moderated the relationship between 
interpretive biases (CNCEQ scores) and anxiety disorder status.  In order to test gender as a 
potential moderator, anxiety disorder status was used as the dependent variable in the logistic 
regression model, then CNCEQ scores were entered into the first predictor block, gender into the 
second block, and the interaction term of gender x CNCEQ scores into the third block.  Block 1 
(CNCEQ scores) was significant (χ² = 6.42, p<.05), and block 2 (gender) was not a significant 
step in the model (χ² = .01, p=.94).  Block 3 was a significant step in the model (χ² = 6.69, 
p<.05), Wald = 5.71, p<.05 for the interaction term, indicating that gender did moderate the 
relationship between interpretive biases and diagnostic status.   
 In order to further explore the significant interaction, post-hoc probing was conducted, as 
recommended by Holmbeck (2002).  The findings of the previous logistic regression analysis 
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illustrated that the association between CNCEQ scores and diagnostic status is conditional on 
values of the moderator (gender); but, those analyses did not identify the specific conditions 
(males/females) by which CNCEQ scores are significantly related to diagnostic status 
(Holmbeck, 2002).  This post-hoc analysis is based on Holmbeck’s (2002) use of linear 
regressions for post-hoc probing, although the present study employs a logistic regression model 
due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (clinic vs. control samples).  To 
examine the conditions of the moderator, the effects of gender (moderator) on the relationship 
between CNCEQ scores (predictor) and diagnostic status (outcome) were tested.  Results of post-
hoc probing showed that the CNCEQ was a significant predictor of diagnostic status for females 
(Wald = 8.52, p<.01, odds ratio = .92) but was not a significant predictor for males (Wald = .01, 
p=.91, odds ratio = 1.00).  
 In order to test age as a potential moderator in a logistic regression model, anxiety 
disorder status was used as the dependent variable, then CNCEQ scores were entered into the 
first predictor block, age as a continuous variable into the second block, and the interaction term 
of age x CNCEQ scores into the third block; and, age was centered in order to reduce the effects 
of multicolinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Results indicated that block 1 (CNCEQ scores) 
was significant (χ² = 6.42, p<.05), and block 2 (age) was not a significant step in the regression 
model (χ² = .31, p=.58).  Block 3 was a statistically significant step in the model (χ² = 5.36, 
p<.05), Wald = 4.29, p<.05 for the interaction term, indicating that age did moderate the 
relationship.  Although results from the ANOVA indicated that age did not influence the 
relationship between CNCEQ scores and diagnostic status, age was dichotomized in the 
ANOVA (7 to 11-year-olds vs. 12 to 17-year-olds), but in the logistic regression analysis, age 
was used as a continuous variable.   
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 Post-hoc probing of the significant interaction was conducted in the same way as with 
gender.  To examine the conditions of the moderator, the effects of age (moderator) on the 
association between CNCEQ scores (predictor) and diagnostic status (outcome) were tested.  
Because age is a continuous moderator, it was centered prior to conducting the analysis in order 
to reduce the effects of multicollinearity; and, this allowed for the creation of slopes 
(representing relationships between predictor and outcome) for values of the moderator one 
standard deviation above and below the mean (Holmbeck, 2002).  The mean age of the full 
sample is 10.97 years and the standard deviation is 3.29 years.  Results of post-hoc probing 
indicated that the CNCEQ significantly predicted diagnostic status for values of age one standard 
deviation above the mean (older children; Wald = 7.75, p<.01, odds ratio = .91) but not for 
values of age one standard deviation below the mean (younger children; Wald = .10, p=.75, odds 
ratio = .99).  Thus, results suggest that the predictive ability of the CNCEQ improved as a 
function of older age.45
 In an additional set of logistic regression analyses, it was examined whether age or 
gender moderated the relationship between judgment biases (ACQ-C scores) and anxiety 
disorder status.  These analyses were conducted in the same way as reported with the CNCEQ, 
and results indicated that neither age nor gender moderated the relationship.   
     
  
                                                          
4 Due to the lack of incremental validity of the CNCEQ over the ACQ-C, it was explored whether the interaction 
terms (gender x CNCEQ scores, age x CNCEQ scores, as created in the previous logistic regression analyses) 
significantly predicted diagnostic status beyond that predicted by the ACQ-C.  Results indicated that neither 
interaction term was a significant predictor while controlling for the ACQ-C. 
5 Due to the large amount of comorbid externalizing diagnoses of the clinic sample, it was also explored whether 
these interaction terms (gender x CNCEQ scores, age x CNCEQ scores) significantly predicted diagnostic status 
beyond that predicted by the CBCL externalizing scale.  Results indicated that these interaction terms remained 
significant while controlling for the CBCL externalizing scale.   
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Discussion 
 This study adds to the research literature by demonstrating that interpretive biases 
(operationalized as negative cognitive errors and measured by the CNCEQ) differentiate youth 
with anxiety disorders from non-anxious youth, as suggested by theory (Beck, 1976; Weems & 
Watts, 2005) but until now not empirically tested.  This study also adds to the literature by 
incrementing evidence that judgment biases (operationalized as anxiety control beliefs and 
measured by the ACQ-C) differentiate youth with anxiety disorders from non-anxious youth 
(Weems et al., 2003).  It is also the first study to demonstrate significant differences in both types 
of cognitive biases across a sample of youth with anxiety disorders and a comparison sample 
matched on age, gender, ethnicity, and family income level.  These results suggest that youth 
with anxiety disorders are more likely to have interpretive and judgment biases than their non-
anxious peers.       
 Results add a congruent line of evidence to research showing a link between anxiety 
problems and interpretive and judgment biases in terms of the extant research showing that these 
biases are linearly related to anxiety symptoms in youth (Epkins, 1996; Leitenberg et al.,1986; 
Leung & Wong, 1998; Watts & Weems, 2006; Weems et al., 2001; Weems et al., 2003; Weems 
et al., 2007).  Furthermore, while several of the previous studies used youth with non-clinical 
levels of anxiety and demonstrated relationships between cognitive biases and anxious 
symptoms, rather than diagnoses (Leitenberg et al., 1986; Watts & Weems, 2006; Weems et al., 
2007), the present study was able to demonstrate differences in the cognitive biases by diagnostic 
status.  While the results are consistent with theory, results also suggest that not every youth with 
an anxiety disorder exhibits more interpretive and judgment biases compared to their non-
anxious peers (the role of moderators will be discussed) and results of the incremental analyses 
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were mixed.  Results do suggest, though, that youth with anxiety disorders are more likely to 
score higher on the measures of these biases. 
 In examining the incremental validity of the CNCEQ and the ACQ-C, it was found that 
the ACQ-C predicted anxiety disorder status while controlling for the CNCEQ, but the CNCEQ 
did not predict anxiety disorder status while controlling for the ACQ-C.  Although previous 
research has demonstrated the incremental validity of both the CNCEQ and ACQ-C in predicting 
anxious symptoms in a community sample (Weems et al., 2007), in the present study the full 
scale CNCEQ did not significantly add to the prediction of diagnostic status beyond that 
predicted by the ACQ-C.  A number of reasons may account for this finding.  The first is that a 
perceived lack of control over external threats and/or negative internal emotional and bodily 
reactions (i.e., judgment bias) is a more salient feature in the experience of an anxiety disorder 
relative to interpreting neutral stimuli in a negative way (i.e., interpretive bias).  The clinic and 
control samples did significantly differ on CNCEQ scores, but this group difference was not as 
large as that with the ACQ-C (Cohen’s d = .63 for CNCEQ, -.91 for ACQ-C).   
 Another explanation may be that the ACQ-C is a better specific predictor of anxiety than 
the CNCEQ.  Evidence and theory suggests there may be content specificity in the type of 
cognitions that differentiate individuals with emotional disorders (Beck, 1976; Laurent & Stark, 
1993; Leung & Poon, 2001; Weems et al., 2007).  That is, the cognitive processes (e.g., to 
catastrophize, to overgeneralize) may not show specificity to different psychological disorders; 
the content of the cognitive schemas (e.g., loss/failure, fear of harm) may be more important 
(Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck et al., 1979).  The content of the ACQ-C is focused on anxiety-
related events and sensations and may, thus, be a better specific predictor of anxiety.  The 
vignettes of the CNCEQ, on the other hand, primarily involve events of loss and failure (Leung 
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& Wong, 1998) and, due to its content, may not be as effective at predicting membership in an 
anxiety disordered sample compared to the ACQ-C.  However, some evidence of incremental 
validity was found using the subscales of the CNCEQ.   
 In terms of incremental validity with the ACQ-C, the overgeneralizing subscale 
performed differently compared to the CNCEQ total score.  Results of logistic regression 
analyses indicated that the overgeneralizing subscale did demonstrate incremental validity over 
the ACQ-C in predicting diagnostic status.  The tendency to overgeneralize (i.e., to believe that a 
single negative outcome is representative of all similar future experiences) may be a more 
important cognitive feature in distinguishing clinically anxious youth compared to the other 
types of negative cognitive errors.  While the relatively small size of the clinic sample should be 
considered and these analyses should be replicated with a larger sample of youth with anxiety 
disorders, the results pointing to differential findings depending on the use of CNCEQ subscale 
scores are consistent with past research showing differential associations with aspects of anxiety 
and depression (Epkins, 1996; Leung & Wong, 1998; Weems et al., 2001; Weems et al., 2007).  
 While the present results were consistent in part with past research, the pattern of 
linkages between anxiety and CNCEQ subscales has not always been consistent.  For example, 
in a community sample of youth, Epkins (1996) used the Social Anxiety Scale for Children—
Revised (SASC-R; La Greca & Stone, 1993) and the Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI; 
Kovacs, 1981, 1992) to form groups of socially anxious children and dysphoric children, and 
found that the overgeneralizing and personalizing subscale scores were significantly higher in the 
social anxiety group compared to the dysphoric group.  In a clinic referred sample of youth, 
Weems et al. (2001), found that the overgeneralizing subscale was the best predictor of trait 
anxiety (as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children—trait scale (STAIC; 
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Spielberger, 1973)), while the selective abstraction subscale was the best predictor of depression 
(as measured by the CDI).  So, while there seems to be some specificity in terms of subscales’ 
links to anxiety, there also seems to be considerable sample variation.  Thus, the results of the 
present study on the CNCEQ need to be understood in light of the moderators of the CNCEQ, as 
will be discussed next.   
  This study also adds to the research literature by describing the effects of age and gender 
on the relationships between interpretive and judgment biases and diagnostic status.  Moderating 
effects were found for the CNCEQ but not for the ACQ-C.  Results are consistent with previous 
research using the ACQ-C in finding that neither gender nor age had an effect on the relationship 
between judgment biases and anxiety in youth (Weems et al., 2003; Weems et al., 2007).  
Regarding the effects of age and gender on CNCEQ scores, previous findings have been mixed 
(e.g., Weems et al., 2001; Weems et al., 2007).  Results from the present study show that both 
age and gender moderated the relationship between CNCEQ scores (interpretive biases) and 
anxiety disorder status.  This finding is partially in contrast to Weems et al. (2001), who found 
that age but not gender moderated the relationship between interpretive biases and self-reported 
anxiety symptoms in a clinically anxious sample of youth; and, it is in contrast to Weems et al. 
(2007), who found that neither age nor gender moderated the relationship between interpretive 
biases and self-reported anxiety symptoms in a community sample of youth.  However, the 
present study differs from both of the previously mentioned studies (Weems et al., 2001; Weems 
et al., 2007) in that it tested moderation on the relationship between interpretive biases and 
diagnostic status, not self-reported anxiety symptoms.     
 Regarding the influence of gender, results from post-hoc analyses suggested that CNCEQ 
scores are significantly related to diagnostic status for females but not males.  That is, males in 
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the clinic sample were not differentiated from males in the control sample based on CNCEQ 
scores.  As mentioned previously, CNCEQ scores did not predict diagnostic status beyond that 
predicted by the ACQ-C and may not be as salient in the experience of clinical anxiety.  Perhaps 
this is true in the experience of clinical anxiety for males.  That is, male youth with anxiety 
disorders may not be characterized by a tendency toward interpretive biases; this may be more of 
a characteristic of female youth with anxiety disorders.  Research has shown that there is 
approximately a 2:1 girl to boy ratio for anxiety disorders (Costello et al., 2004) and that girls 
report more fears than boys (Ginsburg & Silverman, 2000; Ollendick, King, & Frary, 1989; 
Ollendick, Langley, Jones, & Kephart, 2001; Ollendick, Matson, & Helsel, 1985).  It may be 
possible that biased ways of thinking and, specifically, interpretive biases could occur more often 
in anxious females and contribute to the increased rates of anxiety in girls.  With the 
inconsistencies in the literature regarding sex differences in the occurrence of interpretive biases 
in anxious youth (Leitenberg et al., 1986; Weems et al., 2001; Weems et al., 2007), the effects of 
moderation on the CNCEQ should be tested in future studies using larger samples of youth with 
anxiety disorders.      
Regarding the influence of age, findings from the post-hoc analyses suggest that CNCEQ 
scores are significantly related to diagnostic status for older children but not younger children.  
That is, the CNCEQ may be better able to predict diagnostic status in samples of older children.  
Furthermore, while there was not a significant difference across the age groups on the total 
amount of negative cognitive errors made (i.e., CNCEQ total scores), age was negatively linearly 
(as a continuous variable) associated with CNCEQ scores (Table 3).  Together, these findings are 
consistent with other studies in which younger children (in community and clinic samples) tend 
to report more interpretive biases (Leitenberg et al., 1986) but these biases tend to be less 
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associated with anxiety levels (Weems et al., 2001).  Thus, the interpretive biases exhibited by 
younger children may not be indicative of anxious symptoms or anxiety disorders, but of normal 
cognitive development (Weems et al., 2001).  When older children report interpretive biases, it 
may be more strongly related to clinical levels of anxiety.     
The present study also assessed the ability of the ACQ-C to predict diagnostic status 
beyond measures of anxiety and other psychological symptoms.  Theoretically, cognitive biases 
and anxious symptoms (e.g., excessive fear) are two separate facets of childhood anxiety 
disorders and each should be able to predict diagnostic status on their own.  The ACQ-C did 
predict diagnostic status beyond the RCADS-GAD subscale—a measure of DSM-based 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder symptoms, indicating that judgment biases distinguished the 
anxious children from the non-anxious children while controlling for self-reported symptoms of 
anxiety.  This is particularly relevant because GAD was the most common anxiety diagnosis of 
the clinic sample.  The ACQ-C also predicted diagnostic status beyond the CBCL internalizing 
scale—a parent-report measure of general internalizing symptoms and behaviors in his/her child.  
In addition, due to the comorbid diagnoses of the clinic sample, especially ADHD, the CBCL 
externalizing scale was also used as a covariate and results show that the ACQ-C did predict 
diagnostic status while controlling for parent-reported externalizing symptoms and behaviors.  
These results are noteworthy because they suggest that not only do judgment biases (anxiety 
control beliefs) differentiate youth with anxiety disorders from non-anxious youth, but they also 
expand the picture of childhood anxiety disorders beyond emotional disorder symptoms alone.  
That is, assessing judgment biases adds a description of anxiety disorders not evaluated by 
measures of affective and behavioral anxious symptoms.   
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The two remaining covariates in the logistic regression analyses were the RCMAS (a 
measure of self-reported anxiety symptoms) and the CDI (a self-report measure of depression).  
The ACQ-C did not predict diagnostic status while controlling for the RCMAS or the CDI.  The 
RCMAS and CDI were each very strong predictors on their own with the largest effect sizes.  
This may be due to the fact that the RCMAS and the CDI both have large negative affectivity 
and cognitive components (Stark & Laurent, 2001).  For example, the CDI includes questions 
that assess negative thinking (e.g., “I worry that bad things will happen to me,” “I cannot make 
up my mind about things”) and so does the RCMAS (e.g., “I have trouble making up my mind,” 
“I often worry about something bad happening to me”).  Moreover, research has shown that the 
RCMAS is good at identifying anxious versus non-anxious children and the CDI is good at 
identifying depressed versus non-depressed children, but they both lack discriminant validity in 
differentiating anxiety and depression (Brady & Kendall, 1992; Hodges, 1990; Stark, Kaslow, & 
Laurent, 1993; Wolfe et al., 1987).  Taken together, it seems that the RCMAS and CDI are both 
excellent measures of general psychological distress—what many individuals with psychological 
disorders are likely to experience, and so it is not completely surprising that the cognitive 
measures did not predict beyond the RCMAS and CDI in this relatively small sample of anxious 
youth.   
Limitations & Future Directions 
 This study is limited by the small size of the clinic sample and their varied comorbid 
diagnoses.  A larger clinic sample as well as a sample of youth with anxiety disorders only may 
have increased the predictive abilities of the CNCEQ and ACQ-C.  However, comorbidity is, in 
general, more the rule than the exception in childhood (Costello et al., 2004).  The 
generalizability of these findings to other types of clinic samples is unknown.  Future studies 
would benefit from including a sample of youth with anxiety disorders as well as a sample with 
59 
externalizing disorders and a sample with affective disorders.  Another limitation is the cross-
sectional nature of the present study.  It is unclear whether interpretive and judgment biases are 
predictive of anxiety disorders in youth or simply associated with them.  In addition, two other 
types of cognitive biases—attention and memory biases—were not assessed in the present study.  
Research is needed to investigate the relationships among interpretive, judgment, attention, and 
memory biases in samples of youth with anxiety disorders.  Finally, self-report was the only 
method used to assess cognitive biases.  However, child and parent report on diagnostic criteria 
(ADIS-C and ADIS-P) were used together to give diagnoses.  It is important to note that in this 
literature in general, the outcome variable (e.g., levels of anxiety, cognitive biases, anxiety 
disorder status) has typically been limited to self-report and diagnoses (e.g., Weems et al., 2001; 
Weems et al., 2003).  Although, Weems and colleagues (2007) did find that CNCEQ and ACQ-C 
scores predicted variance in levels of anxiety using a combined child and parent report of anxiety 
symptoms.  The next generation of research on this topic may benefit from using other methods 
of outcome evaluation (e.g., behavioral observations, teacher report, avoidance behaviors, etc.).          
 Some issues examined in the present study remain unclear.  The CNCEQ, for example, 
did not predict group membership in the anxiety disordered sample beyond that predicted by the 
ACQ-C and was significantly influenced by developmental and sex differences, which is both 
consistent with and in contrast to previous research (Weems et al., 2001; Weems et al., 2007).  It 
is unclear from the present results if the clinic nature of the sample influences age moderation.  
Specifically, the sample size of the clinic youth was too small to test age as a continuous 
moderator of the cognitive symptoms’ linear relation to RCMAS scores (e.g., the three-way 
interaction in the ANOVA was not significant but the cell size for these analyses was relatively 
small).     
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 The substantial amount of comorbid diagnoses among the anxious youth may have 
limited the theoretical test of the role of cognitive distortions in anxiety disordered youth.  That 
is, the incremental predictive ability of the CNCEQ and ACQ-C in a sample of youth with 
“pure” anxiety disorders (i.e., no comorbid externalizing or affective disorders) remains 
unknown.  However, comorbidity between anxiety and externalizing problems and between 
anxiety and depression is extremely common (Costello et al., 2004).  It should be noted that the 
rates of comorbidity in this sample were unusually high, especially with Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (approximately 79% of the clinic sample met criteria for ADHD).  
Typical rates of children referred for anxiety problems who also have a comorbid externalizing 
disorder are around 20 to 30 percent (Franco, Saavedra, & Silverman, 2007; Masi et al., 2004).   
 Finally, it was found that not all anxious youth exhibit cognitive biases, particularly 
interpretive biases (e.g., males).  Researchers have noted that because the role of cognition in 
childhood anxiety disorders is unclear, specific cognitive intervention for the treatment of 
childhood anxiety disorders may be unnecessary (Alfano et al., 2002).  However, the results of 
this study suggest that some youth with anxiety disorders do indeed exhibit cognitive biases, and 
because biased cognitive processing is likely a significant part of the experience of anxiety at 
least for them, it is more relevant to address these biases in treatment for these youth.  That is, it 
may be practically useful, in terms of treatment for anxiety disorders, to use the CNCEQ and 
ACQ-C to determine which children are exhibiting interpretive and judgment biases.  
Researchers have acknowledged the benefit of prescribing treatment to specific patient 
characteristics (Beutler, 1991; Eisen & Silverman, 1998; Kazdin, 1993).  In the case of 
interpretive and judgment biases, some anxious youth may benefit from a more cognitive 
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treatment approach focused on these issues while others may benefit from a more behavioral 
treatment approach.   
 Despite its limitations, this study shows that interpretive and judgment biases are a 
significant part of the experience of anxiety disorders for many youth.  These biases, which are 
not typically evaluated by commonly used measures of anxious symptoms or by DSM-based 
clinical interviews, may be important in choosing treatment methods that are best matched to the 
individual’s unique characteristics.  The efficacy of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy over the past 
decade points to the usefulness of addressing faulty or biased ways of thinking in anxious youth.  
In addition to changing negative cognitive errors, which some cognitive behavioral interventions 
may already focus on, it would likely be beneficial to also address anxiety control beliefs and 
foster a positive sense of control in anxious children.     
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